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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
:

Case No.
14582

-vsLAWRENCE H. ALLMENDINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appe]. 1.ant v/as charged with unlawful distribution
of a controlled substance, a felony*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
As a result of plea-bargaining, appellant plead
guilty to the lesser offense of possession of a controlled
substance, a misdemeanor.

The Court offered appellant a

year on probation instead of six months in jail, which
appellant

accepted.

Nine months later, appellant was

ordered to show cause as to why probation should not
be revoked.

Appellant moved to dismiss the Order to

Show Cause on the grounds that the court lost jurisdiction
over appellant after six months, which is the maximum
sentence for possession.

The Court den Led the Motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(See Disposition in the Lower Court)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN STATUTORILY
PRESCRIBED DISCRETION IN PLACING APPELLANT ON PROBATION FOR
A YEAR.
Appellant contends that there is no statutory authority for extending probicion beyond the maximum limits prescribed by the legislature for imprisonment for an offense.
Respondent replies that the Utah Code specifically provides
for extentions of probation beyond maximum imprisonment
limits.

Furthermore, the Utah statute is very similar to

most other state and federal statutes in this respect.
The Utah law also parallels standards suggested by the
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American Bar Association and the Model Penal Code.
Finally, respondent submits that several very important
policy considerations are satisfied by the Utah statute*
Therefore, respondent asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the district court.
Contrary to appellant1s assertion that there
is no authority for extending a probation period beyond
a maximum prison sentence, the Utah Code Annotated,
§ 77-35-17 (1953) reads:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if
it appears compatible with the
public interest, the court having
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition
or the execution of sentence and may
place the defendant on probation for
such period of time as the court shall
determine.
The court may subsequently increase
01 decrease the probation period, and
iu<iy revoke or modify any condition
ol probation." (Emphasis added)
Another section of the Utah Code, § 58-37-8(10), which
deals with penalties for possessing marijuanar among other
things, provides that the court may place a defendant on
probation upon "any reasonable terms and conditions as may
be required."

Obviously, the legislature intended to give

the courts a great deal of discretion in granting probation.
Through these provisions the legislature provides all-
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important flexibility in the administration of this
humane perogative.

The court may set the duration of

probation and also modify any conditions thereof.

This

is consistant with the overall policy of the Utah
Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-1-104 (as amended 1975):
"The provisions of this code
shall be construed in accordance
with these general principles: . . .
(3) prescribe penalties. . . which
permit recognition of difference in
rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders,11 (Emphasis
added)
As will be demonstrated, infra p. 7 / there are many
important reasons for a court to have broad discretion
when dealing with so many different people.

Numerous

other states recognize this need, as their code provisions demons!rate.
Com I > in Colorado, like Utah, may grant
probation for whatever period as they deem best (C.R.S.
§ 16-11-202).

Other states allow the trial court to set

probation within some outside limit that has nothing to
do with the possible incarceration limits.

In Nevada,

for example, probation may be extended for as long as
five years (NRS 176.215).

Hawaii, like Nevada places

no less than a five year limit on probation, even for
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misdemeanors (HRS, § 711-77).

Oklahoma permits probation

to extend up to two years (OSA 22 § 991c)j.
Some states have different probation period
limitations depending on whether the defendant was convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor.

Kansas specifies

five years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors.
Furthermore, felony probation may be later extended five
additional years and misdemeanor probation two.

The

statute, however, goes on to provide that, in any case,
felony probation can not be extended past the sentence
limit (KSA 21-4 611).
misdemeanors.

Obviously the same is not true for

In Kansas a misdemeanant may receive only

a year's incarceration (KSA 21-4502).

Therefore, in

Kansas, a misdemeanant may be placed on probation for up
to four times (two years original and two years extension)
as long as the maximum sentence limit.
The Idaho statute is similar to that in
Kansas.

A misdemeanant may be placed on probation for

up to two years (IC 19-2601(7)) although the maximum
sentence is six months imprisonment (IC 18-113).
goes even further.

California

In that state a misdemeanant who could

only be incarcerated for 90 days may be placed on probation for as long as three years (California Penal Code,
§ 1203a) and People v. Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)).
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Oregon has an interesting statute.

In that

state, a defendant may not be placed on probation for
less than a year (ORS 137.010).

Obviously the Oregon

legislature feels that probation for less than a year
is ineffective.
Of all the western states

only Arizona, New

Mexico and Washington restrict probation by the maximum
length of sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 40A-29-19 and
RCW 9.95.200).
Federal statutes (18 USC § 3 651) provide for an
extended probation period and have been supported by
the United States Supreme Court in a line of cases,
primary of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S.
147, 23 L.Ed.2d 162, 89 S.Ct. 1503 (1969).

In Frank,

Mr. Justice Marshall said, for the Court:
"Numerous federal and state
statutory schemes allow significant
periods to be imposed for otherwise
petty offenses. For example, under
federal Jaw, most offenders may be
placed on probation for up to five
years in lieu of or, in certain
cases, j.n addition to a term of
imprisonment.
*

*

*

Therefore, the maximum penalty
authorized in petty offense cases
Includes Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California,
Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado,
New Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma.
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is not simply six months imprisonment and a $500.00 fine. A petty
offender may be placed on probation
for up to five years and if the
terms of probation are violated, he
may then be imprisoned for six
months.n
Finally the American Bar Association has set
forth similar guidelines in its Standards for Criminal
Justice.

The American Bar Association suggests two

years probation for a misdemeanor and up to five for a
felony (Standards, p. 21 Probation).

The committee adds

the opinion that the limits on the length of a sentence
to probation should be determined independently of the
appropriate length of a prison sentence for the same
offense (Standards, p. 26).
There are many good policy reasons for allowing
a trial judge the discretion to extend probation for a
reasonable length of time even if it may be for longer than
the maximum possible sentence.

In his Memorandum Decision

Judge Croft of the lower court listed two strong reasons
in support of probation extension.

First under Utah law

some jail sentences cannot exceed 90 days, as for a Class
C misdemeanor (Section 76-3-204(3)).

A probationary

period of such limited duration hardly serves any useful
purpose.

As Judge Croft pointed out:
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"It is misdemeanor type offenses
where probation is usually indicated
rather than a jail sentence, but if
the supervision of such a wrongdoer is
to be limited to the maximum jail
sentence that can be served, probation in such cases becomes only a
gesture. . . ." (R-76)
Judge Croft goes on to say:
" . . . the court, when given the
alternative of a short jail sentence
or a short and thus useless probation
period, may well start imposing jail
sentences in those cases where proper
probation supervision, if available,
may well steer a defendant away from
further criminal activity." (Id.)
Judge Croft points out a second good reason for an
extended probation period:
"The second reason why I do not
believe the law should or does require the limitation of a probation
period as contended by defendant
is that, as in the case at bar,
defendants in most cases, through
plea negotiations, end up pleading
to a lesser included offense,
frequently doing so in the belief
that a plea to the lesser offense
may more likely result in consideration
for probation. If courts are to be
limited to a brief probation period,
courts are then placed in the position
of either denying the plea to a lesser
included offense, or using jail
sentences as the only reasonable sentence remaining open to the court. . . . "
(R-76)
Probation is an attempt to give first offenders
and some others a chance to demonstrate their capacity to
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overcome their errors.

Another reason for an extension

of this program may be demonstrated by a hypothetical.case.
The accused is convicted and sentenced to probation and
payment of a fine as provided by Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-35-17 (1953, as amended).

Suppose the crime was

a misdemeanor with a penalty of six months in jail.
Further suppose the convicted man was unable to pay the
fine within the six months.

Under the law, as appellant

would have it, the man would have to be thrown in jail.
The more humane view would be to allow the trial judge
the discretion to extend probation beyond the six months
and give the man some additional time to make good his
debt.
Respondent strongly urges this court to affirm
the decision of the lower court.

Appellant would seek

to apply very riqid standards in an area that has a
special need for discretion.

A judge, viewing the defendant

face to face, hearing discussion from both sides concerning
the defendant, and receiving reports from adult probation
and parole is in a much better position to evaluate the
needs of an individual than is the legislature.

The

legislature realized all this and thus specifically and
unequivically endowed the trial court v/ith broad discretion
which respondent asks this court to sustain.
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Appellant alleges that there is ample authority
for his position that probation should be limited by
statutory sentencing provisions.

Respondent answers that

most of appellant's proffered authority is misapplied
and inapplicable to the instant question.

The remainder

simply demonstrates the minority view.
Appellant said the general rule is stated in
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law, § 555 (p.4 of Appellant's
brief).
"Where the suspension of imposition
of sentence is authorized, the court
. . . may, after such suspension, pronounce sentence at any time provided
the maximum period for which sentence
could have been imposed or probation
granted has not elapsed."
A close readincj of the rule, however, and of the case
cited as supper Ling the rule demonstrate that " . . .
maximum period Cor which sentence could have been imposed
. . ."

means the statutory period after conviction in

which the court must pronounce sentence.

It has absolutely

nothing to do with the sentence actually imposed or
maximum possible sentences.

In other words, the rule

simply states that a court can't wait forever to impose
some kind of sentence, whether it is imprisonment or
probation.

The rule has nothing to do with how long

probation may continue if it is imposed.
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On page six of his brief appellant cites
In re Carroll/ a Kansas case, as authority for his
position•

Respondent has already shown that Kansas law

allows probation to continue for up to four times the
maximum incarceration period in the case of a misdemeanor.
If Carroll were still good law there would be a contradiction.

Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has

long since been overturned by legislative action.

In

Application of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P.?d 142 (1968),
the Supreme Court of Kansas explains:
"The parole authority of a police
court was considered in Carroll.
The statute then in effect (Laws
of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) was
examined and since it provided no
limit on the term of a parole granted
thereunder, this court held that a
police court had no power to grant a
parole for a term longer than the
sentence imposed. . . . The statute
was amended in 1947. . . under
which a police court is specifically
authorized to grant a parole for a
term extending beyond the sentence. . .
*

*

*

The language of K.S.A. 20-2312
is plain and unambiguous. . . . The
statute supercedes any case law
pertaining to the subject. (43P P.2d
at 143, 145)
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in
his argument, particular State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho
853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969), and Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho
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474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953).
neither case applies here.

Respondent contends that
In Idaho, although probation

can be four times longer than imprisonment for a misdemeanor, the

rule is different for felonies where pro-

bation is limited by the maximum period of incarceration.
Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve felony
convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the
instant case.

Obviously therefore, neither case is

authority for appellant's position.
Appellant further cites the Oklahoma case of
Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Crim. 275, 233 P.781 (1925).
Suffice it to say that the pertinant Oklahoma statute
has been revised.

Subsequent to 1970 the law in Oklahoma

is that a probation period may be for as long as two
years (OSA 22 § 991c (1970)).
People v. Blakeman, 170 Ca.2d 596, 339 P.2d
202 (1959), a California case, is also unavailable to
appellant as authority.

That case simply states that if

no probation period is specified by the* judge, the maximum
prison term becomes the period of probcition.

It does not

stand for the proposition, as implied by appellant, that
probation could not be longer-

In fact, the California

courts have upheld a three year probation period in a
case where the maximum sentence was 90 days.

(People v.

Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457, 266 C.A.2d 754 (1968)).
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The only other authority cited by appellant is
State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 307 (1974).

Respondent

admits that in New Mexico a convicted person may not be
placed on probation for a longer period than he may be
imprisoned.

However, respondent points out that New

Mexico along with Arizona and Washington are the only
three (out of fourteen) western states that so hold.
Respondent submits that Utah should maintain its position
among those states that espouse the majority view.
Appellant is correct, in his report of the
case law on the subject, that when the trial court
fails to specify the period of probation it is generally
held to be the same as the maximum sentence period.

This

is not a case, however, of an unspecified probation period.
The trial couri very specifically sentenced appellant to
one yeai probul ion.

Thereafter appellant very specifically

accepted that sentence.
POINT II
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND THAT PROBATION BE LIMITED BY SENTENCE PROVISIONS.
In his second argument appellant goes to great
and imaginative lengths in attempting to prove that the
Utah legislature, although not specifically so stating,
meant for probation periods to be limited by the incarceration provisions of the Code.

Respondent submits that a
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simple reading of the statute is more than sufficient
to convey the legislative intent.

As shown, supra,

the Utah legislature very clearly, and with great
supporting intent, meant for trial judges to have
wide discretion in probation matters.

In interpreting

statutes the court should assume that each word of a
statute v/as used advisedly and should be given application in accord with their usually accepted meaning
(Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485
P.2d 1035 (1971).

Respondent submits that the following

words are very clear:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction. . . the Court having jurisdiction. . . may place the defendant
on probation for such period of time
as the court shall determine." (Utah
Code Annotated § 77-35-17~Tr953))
(Umphasis added)
App* Jlant further argues that probation is a
penalty and not d privilege.
of the truth.

This is exactly backwards

When a man commits a crime and is adjudged

to be guilty he can be sentenced to serve a time in
jail or prison.

That would be the penalty for his actions.

Thereafter, as a privilege, granted for whatever humane
reasons, the court may allow that man to be placed on
probation in lieu of incarceration.

Furthermore, respondent

asks this court to take judicial notice that any reasonable
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man would prefer as much as three years probation to
one year in prison confinement.

Obviously appellant

feels this way since he choose, voluntarily and of his
own accord, one yearfs probation rather than six months
in jail.
Finally, appellant argues that a defendant
has certain rights while on probation.
stipulates as much.

Respondent

However, all of the "forward looking

due process concepts" under Morrisey v. Brewer and all
other cases cited by appellant, have absolutely nothing
to do with the length of probation.

This is not a case

where the issue is a revocation hearing, notice, speedy
trial, written findings, or any of the other Morrisey
requirements.

The Utah legislature may make the law on

length of probation and they have wisely chosen to grant
the judge the discretion to solve that problem.
CONCLUSION
Since there is specific statutory authority
supporting the decision of the lower court, and since
Utah's statutes are very similar to those of most other
states, respondent urges this court to affirm the decision
of the lower court.

Such affirmation would carry out the

intent of the legislature of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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